The set of programs written in a small subset of pure Prolog called US is shown to accept exactly the class of regular languages. The language US contains only unary predicates and unary function symbols. Also, a subset of US called RUS is shown to be equivalent to US in its ability in accepting the class of regular languages. Every clause in RUS contains at most one function symbol in the head and at most one literal with no function symbol in the body. The result is very close to a theorem of Matos (TCS April 1997) but our proof is quite di erent. Though US and RUS have the same accepting power, their conciseness of expression is dramatically di erent: if we try to write an RUS program equivalent to a US program, the number of predicates in the RUS program could be O(2 2 N ) where N is the sum of the number of predicates and the number of functors in the US program.
Introduction
Consider a logic programming language containing only a single constant, unary functors, and unary predicates. We call such a language \Unary-String" logic language (US) because we can represent arbitrary nite strings on an alphabet by using the set of functors as our alphabet and the single constant as the terminator of the strings.
In this paper we examine how powerful US programs are as acceptors of formal languages. Since there are only unary functors in a US program P, a Herbrand model 9] of P is a set of ground terms, each of which contains a string of functors (terminated by a constant). Then any predicate q in P de nes a set of strings (a language), for each word f 1 f 2 : : : f k of which the term q(f 1 (f 2 : : : f k (0))) is in the model. Operationally, the word f 1 f 2 : : : f k belongs to the language de ned by q if the goal q(f 1 (f 2 : : : f k (0))) has a refutation w.r.t. P. So a US program works as a machine recognising languages. For a predicate q de ned by several clauses, the set of ground terms satisfying q in the model can be thought of as a union of sets of ground terms each of which is associated with one of the de ning clauses. Conjunctive bodies indicate at least the power to express intersection of languages. Recursively de ned predicates suggest at least the power of Kleene closure of concatenation. Together these observations suggest that at least the class of regular languages can be recognised by US programs. However, we can introduce extra function symbols in a clause body like an input stack, and we can make recursion at any position in a clause body. These observations suggest that US might accept something more complex than regular sets, but the main result of this paper is a proof that:
Proposition US programs accept exactly the class of regular languages.
In other words, the expressive power of US in accepting languages coincides with the class of regular languages. A similar result has been published by Matos 6] but our approach here is quite di erent. Further comparisons with Matos' result will be given in x 5.
Since any regular language can be speci ed by a nite automaton, in order to prove the conjecture, we show a one to one mapping between the set of nite automata and the set of US programs. An automaton A is equivalent to a logic program P if refutation of a ground goal w.r.t. P implies that the path associated with functors in the goal leads A to a nal state, and vice versa.
The proof consists of two parts. Firstly in x 3 we show that any deterministic nite automaton (DFA) can be converted into an equivalent US program. In fact we convert DFA's into programs written in a subset of US called the \Regular Unary String" language (RUS). Because of a strong similarity between transition rules of DFA's and RUS clauses, this part is relatively easy. Secondly, in x 4 we prove that any US program can be converted to an equivalent non-deterministic nite automaton (NFA) withmoves. Since we have to cope with pre xes in clause bodies and conjunction of body literals, the second part is much harder than the rst one. From the two translation results, we conclude that US programs accept exactly the class of regular languages.
In x 2 the small logic languages US and RUS are explained. Also brief de nitions of nite automata are given, partly for introducing some notational conventions. x 3 de nes a conversion scheme from an arbitrary DFA to an RUS program and proves the equivalence. The conversion scheme from US programs to NFA's is presented and proved in x 4. Finally, x 5 discusses related work, then concludes.
Preliminaries
This section de nes the two logic languages US and RUS, and introduces notations for derivations and refutations of logic programs, used in the later sections. Also the section includes brief de nitions of DFA's and NFA's with -moves, and a few notations for graph representations of the automata.
In many cases we use terminology in 5] for logic programming. For automata theory, we adopt notations in 4].
US
Unary String logic language (US) is a language of de nite logic programs 8] containing only one constant 0 which is the terminator of strings of the object language, only one variable X which represents su xes of strings, countably many unary functors, and countably many unary predicates. The syntax of US is given in Figure 1 .
The language does not contain negations nor any extra-logical predicates. Extralogical predicates such as read, write, assert, retract impede logical reading of programs, on which our conjecture relies. Negation might be understood in connection with complementation of regular sets, but we have left it for future work. Furthermore, we assume that the constant 0 may appear only in unit clauses. Ground body literals might work as guards before computing the intersection of the other non-ground goals, but do not seem to provide especially interesting consequences, and we exclude them.
Thus, examples of legal clauses of US include:
but not p(f(g(X))) q(g(0)); r(h(k(X))): An atom of US is denoted p(f 1 : : : f n (!) : : :), or p( f(!)), where ! is either 0 or X. Clauses are denoted by symbols C 0 ; C 1 ; : : :, and symbols G 0 ; G 1 ; : : : denote goals. A derivation of a goal G 0 w.r.t. a program P is a nite or in nite sequence of goals G 0
where C i 's are clauses in P and G i is derived from G i 1 and C i by one step resolution.
A refutation is a nite derivation of which the last goal is empty: every clause has at most one atom in its body, every unit clause has no functor symbol, every non-unit clause has exactly one functor symbol in its head, and there is no functor symbol in any clause body.
The syntax of RUS is given in Figure 2 . The language is quite restrictive. Every RUS clause must have one of the following forms:
are not allowed in RUS.
Finite state automata
A deterministic nite automaton A is a 5-tuple (Q; ; ; q 0 ; F) where Q is a nite set of states, is a nite input alphabet, q 0 2 Q is the initial state, F Q is the set of nal states, and is a transition function of type Q ! Q. It is well known that any non-deterministic nite automaton with empty transitions can be converted into an equivalent deterministic nite automaton 4].
State transition system (STS) In order to make a clear matching between logic programs and recognising machines, occasionally we use a term: state transition system (STS). An STS is an automaton without initial state: i.e. for any FA (deterministic or non-deterministic) A = (Q; ; ; q 0 ; F), we de ne an STS S = (Q; ; ; F). We can de ne many di erent automata based on S by choosing a speci c state in Q as an initial state.
In the subsequent arguments, strictly speaking, logic programs correspond to STS's and a pair of a logic program and a predicate name corresponds to a pair of STS and an initial state, namely an automaton. 
Derivation of RUS program
From a nite automaton A = (Q; ; ; q 0 ; F) we construct an RUS program P rus as follows:
1. For each state q 2 Q, introduce a unary predicate q.
2. For each symbol in alphabet f 2 , introduce a unary functor f. 3 . For each transition rule (p; f) ! q, we add a clause p(f(X)) q(X) to P rus .
4. For each nal state q j 2 F, we add a unit clause q j (0) to P rus . We claim that the derived program P rus is equivalent to the nite automaton A, in the sense of the following theorem. So the derivation is a refutation of the initial goal.
Only if:
Suppose a goal G 0 = q 0 (f 1 : : : f n (0) : : :) has a refutation w.r.t. the derived program, i.e. there is a refutation of G 0 :
We have to nd an accepting path of f 1 : : : f n from q 0 . If n = 0 the initial goal is q 0 (0). In order to derive an empty goal, the program must contain either q 0 (X) or q 0 (0). However, since every unit clause in the derived program is constructed from Rule 4, the clause must be q 0 (0). Then q 0 is a nal state of A and there is a path of length 0 (q 0 ) accepting the empty string.
If n > 0, because of the form of the initial goal and the general form of nonunit clauses in the derived program, the rst clause in the refutation must be C 0 = q 0 (f 1 (X)) q 1 (X) for some predicate q 1 . Thus the automaton contains the states q 0 ; q 1 and a transition rule (q 0 ; f 1 ) ! q 1 .
From G 0 and C 0 we derive the next goal G 1 = q 1 (f 2 : : : f n (0) : : :). The same argument as for G 0 holds for G 1 , and the automaton contains another state q 2 and another transition rule (q 1 ; f 2 ) ! q 2 , and so on, inductively. In general the automaton contains transition rules (q j ; f j+1 ) ! q j+1 for all 0 j n 1. In order to refute the second last goal q n (0) the program contains a unit clause q n (0), and hence, q n is a nal state.
If we combine the transitions above, we can construct a path:
So, the string f 1 : : : f n from q 0 is accepted by the nite automaton.
4 Deriving an FSA from a US program
In the previous section we have shown that any DFA is equivalent to an RUS program which is also a US program since RUS is a proper subset of US. In this section we prove that any US program is equivalent to an NFA with -moves. Here we frequently use the term STS de ned in x 2.3.
In order to construct the nite automaton A equivalent to (a pair of a predicate An STS A 0 = (Q; ; ; F) is constructed from P us as follows:
The input alphabet is the set of all functors in P us . 
Interpretation of body literals
Now we consider subgoals in non-unit clauses. A clause p( f(X)) q( h(X)) can be read declaratively as: \If for some term t, q( h(t)) is true, then p( f(t)) is true as well."
In order to convert the clause into a set of state transitions, we paraphrase \p(t) is true" as \t leads the machine from p to a nal state". Thus we re-write the above sentence as
p(a(b(X))): Thus we connect the bottom state f p; f]g of the clause head with each goal state in GSfq( h(X))g by an -move. By this connection the string f is connected to the strings represented by X starting from each goal state in GSfq( h(X))g. Hence, if there is a path from any state of GSfq( h(X))g to a nal state, we obtain an accepting path from f p]g. Example 3 Consider the three clauses and a goal:
Given the program and the query, Prolog systems give the answer X = a(c(e(0))).
In In this example we can easily nd the states to be connected to a bottom state. In general, however, a body literal may contain a longer list of functors than that of any Computing goal states By examining refutations of a body literal q( h(X)), we can derive its goal states GSfq( h(X))g.
In some resolution steps in a refutation, pre xes of h in the initial goal are removed from chosen literals by clauses unifying with them. We want to know the clauses which remove the last functor of h, because the heads of such clauses contain the goal states we are searching for.
Consider a literal q( h(X)) and its refutation:
If the clause C 1 is a unit clause, G 1 is in fact the nal 2, and C 1 contains a goal state. Otherwise G 1 consists of subgoals g 1 ; : : : ; g n (n > 0). The original goal G 0 is reduced to an empty goal when g 1 ; : : : g n are all reduced to empty goals. Then, the sequence of goals G 0 ; G 1 ; : : : ; 2 can be represented as a proof tree 8], in which nodes at depth j denote the subgoals in G j from left to right order. Every leaf of the tree is an empty goal, and each edge connects a literal with either its descendant subgoals, or (possibly an instance of) the same literal in the next goal.
Example 4 (Proof tree) Assuming the left to right selection rule 8] of Prolog systems, a refutation of a literal G 0 = p(f(g(X))) by clauses C 1 ; : : : ; C 6 is represented as a proof tree:
Since every leaf of the tree is an empty goal, for each path from the root to a leaf, there is exactly one edge connecting a subgoal containing a su x of f(g(X)) with either a subgoal which does not contain any su x, or an empty goal. Thick down arrows (+) indicate these edges. Each clause used in such a resolution step must either contain a su x of f(g(X)) in its head, or else be a unit clause with a non-ground term. The goal state derived from this refutation is the compound state, each element of which is a state in A 0 corresponding to one of these clause heads.
In the above example, because the head of C 1 contains only a pre x of the argument of G 0 , both subgoals in G 1 contain g. Whereas, in the second resolution step, the head of C 2 has the argument h(g(l(X))) which contains g. Thus Example 5 Consider a program p( f(X)) q( h(X)):
:: C 1 q( h( g(X))) s( a(X)):
:: C 2 q( h 1 (X)) r( f(X)):
:: C 3 r( f( h 2 ( g(X)))) t( b(X)): :: C 4 where in C 3 and C 4 ( h 1 ; h 2 ) is a partition of h. We search for goal states of the literal q( h(X)) in C 1 . One derivation starts with a step using C 2 .
q( h(X)) C 2 ! s( a(X))
The last goal does not contain su x of h, since the term h( g(X)) in C 2 is an instance of the term h(X) in the literal. The state f q 1 ; h]g is a goal state of q( h(X)).
There is another derivation:
The clause C 3 is used in the rst step removing h 1 , then the clause C 4 is used, removing h 2 . So the state f r; f; h 2 ]g is another goal state of q( h(X)), and GSfq( h(X))g = ff q 1 ; h]g; f r; f; h 2 ]gg 2
Construction of A
Since every body literal in a clause has a variable X in common, conjunction of literals implies that terms satisfying individual literals must share a su x denoted by X. In the context of a nite automaton, a clause p( f(X)) q 1 ( h 1 (X)); : : : ; q k ( h k (X)) can be interpreted as:
If there is a path t such that, for all 1 j k each path h j followed by t leads the automaton from f q j ]g to a nal state simultaneously, then the path f followed by t leads the machine from f p]g to a nal state.
So we need to check whether the k paths, one from each literal, share a sequence of alphabet symbols. In order to convert the conjunctive goal q 1 ( h 1 (X)); : : : ; q k ( h k (X)) into a graph, then, we must examine all possible k-tuples of paths, since each literal denotes a set of paths starting from corresponding goal states.
Suppose each conjunct q j ( h j (X)) has l j goal states, i.e.
GSfq j ( h j (X))g = fs 1 j ; : : : ; s l j j g
(1 j m)
Then we consider each of (l 1 : : : l k ) states fs m 1 1 : : : s m k k g (1 j k, 1 m j l j ).
If it is not in A, then add it to the graph and add an -move connecting the bottom state f p; f]g with it.
Then we examine whether every component of the state has an out-going arc with the same symbol. If so, we consider another compound state consists of destination states of each component. If it is not in A add it and connect with the previous state by an edge associated with the symbol. Every compound state has at most one outgoing arc with a symbol. We can view the part of the automaton corresponding to a conjunctive body as a shadow of a part of A 0 , because every path in the new part has a set of copies in A 0 . We repeat the process until no new state or arc can be added to the graph. We construct A from A 0 by converting all non-unit clauses one by one, iteratively. The automaton A is a xpoint of this iteration.
Using an auxiliary procedure Expand, the formal procedure to derive A from A 0 is de ned as follows.
1. Initialise A=A 0 and E= . E is a set of empty moves from bottom states already considered.
2. Repeatedly apply the following procedure to A until we reach a xpoint.
(a) For each non-unit clause p( f(X)) q( h 1 (X)); : : : ; q n ( h n (X)) construct the cross product S = S 1 : : : S n where S j = GSfq j ( h j (X))g. The state f p]; q]g is the rst compound state generated for the conjunctive body of the clause C 5 . From this state, we start tracing two paths, one from f p]g, another from f q]g in parallel.
In Figure 11 , Since both f p]g and f q]g have outgoing edge associated with f, a new compound state f p; f]; q; f]g and an edge with f are added to A. The move 
Veri cation of the construction
The following theorem states that the constructed automaton A is equivalent to P us .
Theorem 2 The nite automaton A, constructed from P us by the procedure described in the previous section, accepts a string f 1 : : : f n from a state q if and only if the goal q(f 1 : : : f n (0) : : :) has a refutation w.r.t. P us .
Proof
If part:
Suppose the goal G 0 = q(f 1 : : : f n (0) : : :) has a refutation: We show that there is a sequence of moves, possibly interspersed by -moves, from the state q to a nal state, associated with symbols f 1 ; : : : ; f n in this order.
The proof is by induction on the length of the derivation.
{ Base case:
If the goal has a one-step refutation (m=1), then P us must contain a unit clause C 1 
{ Inductive case:
Assume that for each goal with a refutation of length at most k 1, the au-tomaton A accepts the corresponding string, and G 0 = q(f 1 : : : f n (0) : : :) has a refutation of length k. The number of -moves in the path from s 1 : : : s m to the nal state in (6) is k 1 which is the sum of the number of -moves in each path starting from an element of s 1 : : : s m . Then every path corresponding to a subgoal in (7) has at most k 1 -moves, and hence from the induction hypothesis, each subgoal in (7) has a refutation. Since each subgoal in (5) has a refutation, the initial goal has a refutation. 2 5 Discussion and conclusion
Expressiveness of US and RUS
This subsection considers expressive di erences between US and RUS. We have proven two lemmas; any US program can be transformed into an equivalent NFA with -moves, and any DFA can be transformed into an equivalent RUS program. Since any NFA with -moves can be converted into an equivalent DFA, we obtain a translation scheme from US to its subset RUS: US ) NFA with moves ) DFA Moreover, we have to convert the automaton into a DFA. An NFA with -moves can be converted into an equivalent DFA in two steps, i.e. rst, removing every -move in an NFA, then converting the NFA into an equivalent DFA 4]. When -moves are removed, the number of states does not change, but conversion of an NFA into a DFA causes, potentially, an exponential increase in the number of states, since the states of resulting DFA correspond to a subset of states in the NFA. Thus the number of states in the DFA, could be, in the worst case, 2 2 (Np +N f ) ! However, in an automaton derived from a US program, only predicate states, bottom states, and compound states containing a bottom state of its component, have multiple outgoing edges. Besides, all outgoing edges from bottom states are -moves. After eliminating -moves by the procedure described in 4], the number of states having multiple outgoing edges, where non-determinism could occur, does not change.
Expressive power and answer set
Matos gives a di erent proof of a very similar equivalence theorem 6]. In his terminology monadic logic programs correspond to US programs in this paper, except that Matos' monadic logic programs may contain several constants but our US programs contain only one constant 0.
In order to prove equivalence between regular sets and monadic programs, Matos reduces his monadic logic programs into a subset called linear monadic programs, which he proves to accept exactly the set of regular languages. The resulting linear program accepts the same languages as the original general monadic program does.
Firstly he shows that if a monadic program does not contain clauses with conjunctive bodies, it can be reduced to a set of clauses in which every body predicate has no functor symbol.
Then any monadic program containing a clause with a conjunctive body is shown to be reducible to a set of linear clauses plus a clause containing only two body predicate terms each of which does not contain functors.
Finally from this program Matos derives simultaneous equations in which every predicate name is represented by a language variable. By solving these equations he again reduces the clause with two body predicates into a linear form.
The main di erence between Matos' proof and ours is that he avoids direct construction of intersection of automata corresponding to each member of a conjunctive body as we did, by rst reducing the clause body to its minimal form, then proving that we can solve the corresponding algebraic equation.
In both cases the hardest part of the proof is how to handle conjunctive clause bodies. In our proof, we directly build up the intersection of body predicates by tracing the path on the graph built from clause heads. The idea that any body predicate term must have corresponding states (goal states) in the basis (A 0 ) is essential to our proof.
Di erent types of correspondences
The correspondence between US programs and regular sets in this paper is very different from the correspondences between logic programs and grammars more usually considered in the literature. Papers such as 1, 2, 3] discuss the similarity of derivation trees of grammars and proof trees of logic programs. A proof tree of a de nite logic program of propositional form is similar to a derivation tree of a context free grammar (CFG). Each propositional term in the logic program corresponds to a non-terminals in the CFG. The arguments of predicate terms in more general logic programs can be viewed as an embedded stack for an indexed grammar 1], or a set of attributes in an attribute grammar 3] . Because of this extra information, their proof-tree grammars are some extension of CFG. However, authors studying such correspondences are not interested in the answer set of the logic program.
There seem to be few papers discussing the power of logic programming systems in describing language acceptors. The expressive power of logic language can be discussed in the context of the process of calculating the answer set as in this paper. Such research may provide clues about the source of the expressive power of logic languages.
Accepting power of less restricted string logic programs
This paper is based on a part of the rst author's dissertation 7] which contains two other results about the accepting power of restricted pure Prolog with only unary function symbols.
If we allow the language to contain binary predicates, and every clause in the language contains at most one body literal, it is already powerful enough to describe acceptors of any recursively enumerable language. In other words, it can describe Turing machines: the two string arguments in a predicate can serve as the left and the right part of the tape.
If we now restrict the above binary predicate language so that the set of function symbols appearing in the rst and the second arguments is disjoint, then only Context Free language can be recognised. One of the arguments can serve as a stack, while the other represents the rest of the input string.
Conclusion and further work
We have shown that Unary String logic programs accept exactly the set of regular languages. Also, the set of Regular Unary String logic programs, a subset of Unary String logic programs, has already enough power to accept the set of regular languages, although a shortest RUS program may have a number of predicates exponentially greater than the number of predicates and functors of its shortest US counter part.
